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MODERN GERMAN DOCTORS: A FAILURE OF
PROFESSIONALIZATION?

by
Charles E. McClelland

[Conference paper at German Historical Institute, Washington, DC later published in
Manfred Berg and Geoffrey Cocks (eds.), Medicine and Modernity: Public Health and
Medical Care in Nineteenth- and Twentieth-Century Germany (New York and
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 81-97.]

This conference would perhaps not have come into being were it not for the
nagging and still inadequately answered questions raised by the Nuremberg Tribunal
about the "perversion", as Michael Kater has aptly called it, of German medicine. Perhaps
the major question still looming over the history of medicine in twentieth-century
Germany was succinctly put in the title of Alexander Mitscherlich's 1947 book on the
Nuremberg physicians' trials, Medizin ohne Menschlichkeit, also translated as Doctors of
Infamy.i How could a modern medical community with a tradition of classical as well as
scientific learning, the descendants of Hippocrates and the collective bearers of scientific
professionalism, ignore the admonition in the Hippocratic oath to "maintain the utmost
respect for human life from the time of its conception"?ii How could the German medical
profession, the peer if not the envy of its colleagues abroad at the outbreak of World War

I, have sunk to the level of a colluder in genocide during World War II? Can historical
analysis offer anything to answer this question, especially its ethical, legal and political
dimensions? In particular, can the new social history, especially the history of education
and professions, add any new hints?

In recent years historians' attention has shifted somewhat from a focus on the tiny
minority of German doctors who carried out perverted experiments in death camps or had
a direct role in mass murder. It is for the social historian equally interesting to ask about
the "normal" people among the nearly 60,000 physicians working in Hitler's Germany.
May we justifiably speak, as Michael Kater did in his stimulating Journal of
Contemporary History article of 1985, of the "failed socialization and professionalization
of German medical doctors over previous [to 1933] decades"?iii Did in fact "elements of
their professional development predispose the German physicians to fascism in the
twentieth century and ultimately set many, if not the majority, apart from other doctors of
the western world who had once sworn the Hippocratic oath"?iv

This essay, regretfully, must leave aside such primary questions as that most
grievous breach of medical ethics, the misuse of concentration-camp inmates and
assisting in the Holocaust, because they cannot easily be addressed by analyzing medical
professionalization. The number and hierarchical position of the doctors involved was
such as to make generalizing from them about the whole medical profession highly
dubious. Even camp doctors, as Robert Jay Lifton shows, hardly behaved in a uniform
way.v Nor does the proclivity of many doctors before 1933 to evince interest in the

"eugenics" movement, reproductive sterilization programs, or even euthanasia for the
incurably ill constitute a "special case" marking them off from their colleagues elsewhere,
including Britain and America.

If the history of professionalization of physicians can shed new light, it is on some
other, perhaps less existential questions: why did doctors, especially, find the Nazi party
attractive? Even if we can assume that the vast majority of German physicians had
nothing to do with medical "perversions," there must have been reasons why so many
went along with other aims of the Nazi regime, at least initially. Were they more
susceptible than other professional groups? If so, is there indeed something peculiar
about their socialization and professionalization?

Michael Kater is not alone in asserting that German doctors suffered from a
"legitimation crisis," social insecurity (but at the same time class snobbism), the
autocratic tinge to medical training, suspicion of women and Jews as colleagues, and a
proclivity toward conservative political views.vi Yet at the same time, German medical
standards, scientific training and professionalism were admired throughout the world
both under and after the Empire, so much so that the Flexner Report on the reform of
American medical education in 1910 held it up as the model.vii Were German physicians
poorly socialized or professionalized in comparison to their colleagues abroad or their
fellow-professionals in Germany? Or, to what extent might the same factors that led to
their profession being admired before World War I, under the radically changed postwar
political, economic and social conditions, have started a process of decline or crisis? Is

the antithesis stated in Mitscherlich's title more dramatic than real? Or did highly
professionalized modern medicine easily coexist with Nazi barbarism?

To rephrase the Looming Question into a more manageable one for the purposes
of this essay, to what degree can the history of professionalization and professionally
organized behavior in an advanced society serve as a useful analytical tool and a key to
the tensions that might produce the dramatic reversal in the reputation of German
medicine over a mere generation? Although I have little space to explore them here an
any depth, I would like to stress the importance for new perspectives of comparative
angles of view. How did the other "products" of the German university system, the
graduates of the traditional university faculties and later of the technical and other higher
educational colleges, evolve in their professional bodies, and did they behave differently
from MDs? What can one learn by comparisons to the professionalization history of
neighboring countries?

Allow me to repeat today a definition of a modern profession I have used
elsewhere: "an exclusive, specialized, life-long form of labor which is accessible -- in a
division-of-labor society -- only on the basis of a long, expensive and theoretically-based
education."viii Even in a country where education was relatively inexpensive, the costs of
obtaining the necessary qualifications for professions had become high enough by the late
nineteenth century to make the "old" professions of medicine and law (the clergy was an
exception) as well as such "new" ones as engineering and teaching into occupations

qualitatively much more removed than before from others. It is this process which I mean
by "professionalization." University-level education was now the chief watershed and led
to a large degree of overlap between the professional class and the Bildungsbürgertum. It
is therefore hardly surprising to find the attitudes among all German professionals, not
just physicians, reflective of the elite values of the university-trained middle class.

It is important to note that learned professions (including medicine) did not enjoy
in previous centuries the consistently high public esteem they came to have by 1900 (and
still, according to public opinion surveys, tend to retain today).ix It is perhaps not
exaggerating too much to point out that the medical butchers of Auschwitz had only to
fall back to the level of the medical pioneers of a century before, if that far, to find their
technical (if not moral) peers. From the inception of their organization into modern
national associations, all German professions aimed at die Hebung des Standes -- the
raising of the collective professional "estate." German physicians followed some of the
same paths toward this as their counterparts in other fields in Germany as well as some
shared with physicians abroad; they also, however, pursued professionalization under
some unusual and even unique conditions.
Perhaps no other modern or modernizing profession had come to depend so
heavily for its legitimation on swift advances in science as was the case of medicine, and
relatively less on strategies of market control. The degree to which the German medical
profession was "scientifized" under the Empire was probably the highest in the world.
(British and even French physicians could also scoff at the relative German neglect of

hospital or clinical training and "bedside manner".) Pride in "scientific" achievement
could nevertheless be shared by the leadership groups in the medical profession itself and
the leadership of the German higher educational system, backed by the German states
with sensible policies and lavish financial resources. As I have argued elsewhere, barring
artificial restrictions on admission to medical training (which neither government highereducation policy nor a majority of German physicians favored), the path for limiting
ruinous competition in the profession lay exactly in the promotion by the profession of
ever-higher educational qualifications for new physicians.x

One can only speculate about the resulting proclivity of many German doctors to
seek status reinforcement from the outside. Recourse to "authority" such as science was
certainly one strategy. When this appeared to fail, as during the Great Depression, a turn
to the "strong state" had its appeal (even though the NSDAP was basically more in
sympathy with "alternative" than "school" medicine, as German MDs discovered to their
horror in 1939 with the passage of the Lay Healer's Law). Perhaps the question to be
raised --and it certainly cannot be answered here -- is not so much why German doctors
were "authoritarian" as why French and British doctors did not get an opportunity to
throw in their lot with an initially successful fascist regime.

The process of professionalization is an almost universal phenomenon
accompanying modernization, urbanization and industrial as well as postindustrial
change. It should not, however, be thought of as an absolute condition (either there is
professionalization, or there is not); nor as irreversible; nor as linearly continuous or

"progressive." It is almost impossible to conceive of something called "perfect
professionalization," since the very term designates a process that is far from uniform in
time, geography or even among different occupations. Should such perfection ever be
momentarily achieved, however, it could hardly be maintained, at least in a changing and
relatively free-market society.

A look at the historical vicissitudes of the professionalization process in Germany,
and particularly with regard to German medicine, might show us this most dramatically.

One could reasonably argue that German medicine was professionalizing well
down to 1900, even to the start of World War I, although under conditions different from
those in many foreign countries.

The professionalization of modern German medicine began well before the
creation of a German national state. Even under the Empire, the education and
certification of doctors remained a prerogative of the federal states, as did the
administration of medical ethics (in the course of time increasingly through
Aerztekammer or Medical Chambers). The medical profession continued to be organized
locally and regionally, with the national medical association (Deutscher
Aertzevereinsverband, or DAeV, founded in 1873) as a league of regional medical
societies rather than an association of individual members. Membership in medical
societies was voluntary; but in most states membership in the medical chambers was or
became compulsory, and the leadership of both types of professional organization tended

to overlap.

The DAeV was concerned chiefly with the status of the profession, including
issues of training and certification. The local and state medical chambers dealt mostly
with policing medical ethics, but these were defined in practice more by questions of
unfair competition than malpractice involving patients. It is worth noting that certain
categories of physicians, e.g. military and state medical officers, were not required to
belong to the chambers on the argument that their bureaucratic superiors would supervise
their activities. Finally, although sickness-insurance funds to some degree pre-dated the
founding of the German Reich, they remained local and diversified in administration and
structure even after the creation of a national health-insurance system in the 1880s. Their
counterpart was the nationally-organized Hartmann-Bund (to which doctors did belong as
individual members), which in turn affiliated with the DAeV before World War I.

German medical leaders had boldly struck a bargain with the new national
government in 1869. Despite the localized and heterogeneous nature of the medical
profession and its working conditions, medicine was one of the two major traditional
professions (along with attorneys) to be affected by a national "framework law." The
medical profession, just then organizing on a national scale, even conceded the lifting of
laws against unlicensed practice, or "quackery," in order that the Reichsgewerbeordnung
declared medicine a "free profession". This meant that medicine would no longer be
tightly controlled by state bureaucracies but left to the free play of the market, within
certain limits. The chief spokesmen and negotiator for the medical profession in striking

this deal was the Berlin Medical Society, itself heavily influenced by liberal ideology and
a professorial faith in the obvious superiority of "school" medicine.

Not all members of the DAeV were entirely happy with this national legislation.
The practice of medicine as covered by the Reichsgewerbeordnung was treated as a
"trade." Not only did this seem demeaning to many physicians; it rankled even more that
non-licensed health-care providers, such as herbalists, wise women, shepherds and others
dismissed by the MD's as "quacks" were allowed to practice freely also. Many in the
medical profession as well as the DAeV persisted in demanding a national physicians'
code (Reichsärzteordnung) that would, inter alia, suppress competition from these socalled Kurpfuscher. Such an aim was quite consistent with "power" theories of
professionalization, which posit the drive to monopoly over the market as the only real
goal of professional organizations, as well as with the attitudes of doctors in other
countries (e.g. America).

Failing to convince the state to criminalize "quack" practice, however, the medical
profession fell back on arguments that only school medicine, with its ever-higher
educational and scientific requirements, provided real therapy. Ironically, the expansion
of the sickness-fund system, while having an unwelcome effect on the complete freedom
of doctors in matters of treatment and fees, at least helped in the marginalization of
"quacks." (The funds nevertheless continued to hire paramedically-trained people such as
medical students and nurses for tasks the profession believed should be carried out by
fully licensed physicians.)

The practical effect of continued endorsement of the most open access to medical
training consistent with completion of secondary school was a flood of new doctors, with
especially high crests in years of slow economic growth. A minority of doctors began
raising calls for a numerus clausus or restriction on the number of students admitted to
the study of medicine as the least painful form of professional market control. Yet all
such calls were resisted by the majority of the rapidly-growing German medical
profession and its major organization, the DAeV. Its persistent answer for overcrowding
came from another angle -- that of Verwissenschaftlichung. Raising the cost of medical
education in terms of time and difficulty of study and examinations was the route chosen
consistently by the DAeV (and, beginning a generation later, also of the American
medical profession). Yet there was also a limit to manipulation of such standards of
knowledge: they could not arbitrarily be increased or decreased over short time-periods,
since the arguments for increasing them were linked to the progress of knowledge. A
countervailing "interest of state" also led in the direction of easy access to medical
training for various reasons -- whether wartime emergency (as in 1914-18), need to fill
panel physicians' slots in an expanding health-insurance scheme, or even meritocratic and
democratic ideology.

As in other fields of study, medicine changed its traditional student recruiting
base, especially in the early twentieth century. Traditionally a field for ambitious young
men of commercial and lower-middle class families (compared to law, which drew

heavily on the Bildungsbürgertum and administrative elites), medicine had also offered a
haven to scions of Jewish families in the German Empire -- precisely because it was a
"free" profession. The expansion of student bodies in the early twentieth century, and
especially in the 1920s, meant a far larger number of future physicians facing stiff
competition; for many, financial exigency during student years and worry about the
future; and a sense of desperation about the need to change the system if they were to
survive. The Nazi promise to rid universities of Jews and women -- in effect a numerus
clausus affecting some 36% of medical students in 1933 -- thus had a certain attraction,
especially among students whose social and economic backgrounds made their future
professional existence precarious in the extreme.xi

Thus the German path to increased professionalization paralleled the path of ever
higher scientific and educational qualifications precisely for the younger aspirants to the
profession. There were already numerous complaints about overproduction of doctors,
ruinous competition, sinking average incomes and the like by the beginning of the
twentieth century. The progressive inclusion of more and more citizens in the mandatory
health insurance scheme, while providing more patients, also limited the fees and
working conditions of panel physicians.

One must also consider the unique set of conditions of the German medical
market caused by sickness insurance. It undoubtedly facilitated, inter alia, the support of
many more doctors than would have been possible without it. At first a mere cloud on the
horizon in the 1880s, it was greeted with indifference or even positively by doctors. Even

later it never upset German physicians in any way remotely comparable to the tantrums
of American doctors against "socialized medicine" over the past 70 years. No majorities
of German physicians ever called for the abolition of the sickness funds, which were a
rational substitute for the old obligation (also abolished in 1869) of any doctor to treat
any indigent patient gratis. Further, until the Insurance Reform of 1911, mandatory
coverage had been extended to citizens in the lower income classes, which opened up a
new market in services, even if the regulated fees were low.

Even when the medical profession began to collide with other social and political
institutions, it showed both power and responsibility. One might cite the widespread
strikes of 1913 against the provisions of the new insurance law, which forced a
compromise on the insurance funds. In these steps toward greater professional solidarity
and organization, German doctors pushed through many long-standing demands, such as
the insurance patients' right to choose their physician.

If "power" over the market in services is the best indicator of "successful"
professionalization, as the current fashionable theory holds, (with "perfection" equaling
"monopoly"), German medicine probably could not be said to compete equally with
British or American equivalents in 1914. But by many other traditional measures of
professionalization, such as the existence of self-regulating ethics bodies
(Aertzekammer), prestige and public trust, economic security, a high degree of
inclusiveness in professional organizations and of effectiveness of the same, and

autonomy in the exercise of one's professional practice, one can see on the whole marked
advances in 1914 over the previous half-century.

Instead, some historians have referred to the phenomena of interwar Germany in
terms of "deprofessionalization," with characteristic massive overcrowding, economic
insecurity and ruthless competition, and the entry or expansion of recruits from
heretofore little-included strata of the population. What made the economic crisis of
Weimar Germany even more wrenching for young medical professionals, however, was
that the scientific standards set already before 1914 were not relaxed (except during
World War I). Thus professional standards remained nominally high, while professional
prospects became very dim for a generation.

Can "professionalization" and "deprofessionalization" take place at the same
time? Ironically, both tendencies appeared present in the tumultuous years of the Weimar
Republic.

The results of World War I greatly exacerbated the conditions under which all
doctors worked, but it was especially dire for young people. If the universities of Imperial
Germany were producing too many physicians, as was argued in 1913, then those of the
Weimar Republic went into hyperinflation. Competition for clients was made even more
acute by the economic crises of the Weimar era, during some of which even the medical
insurance coverage had to be curtailed.

These conditions were not unique to Germany. The successor states to AustriaHungary experienced similar phenomena of "deprofessionalization." Well before and
more vehemently than in the German Reich, for example, Hungarian doctors and lawyers
developed a strong affinity for fascist doctrines and anti-Semitic jargon of which they had
been remarkably free before 1914. As in Germany, Hungary had a very large number of
physicians who happened to be Jewish. The proportion of Jewish physicians in the lands
of the former Austro-Hungarian empire was even higher than in Germany, where it was
quite high by standards further west.

Trends of deprofessionalization (in terms of income, status, occupational security
and even social esteem) appear to have had the greatest impact on the young, the
economically less well-off, and the non-specialist. Not surprisingly the leadership of the
DAeV and other medical associations tended to belong to the senior generation and to be
cushioned by success against many of the effects of deprofessionalization. One could thus
legitimately hypothesize a "professionalization crisis" as a major cause for the support
found among German doctors -- particularly among younger ones -- for Nazi promises to
make not only the German race but the medical profession "healthy" again.xii

One should not, of course, conclude either that the DAeV and the German
medical profession generally were inclined to enthusiasm for democracy, liberalism or
leftist causes. Physicians were by necessity members of the Bildungsbürgertum, and most
were operating small businesses, in economic terms. The political left constituted the
enemy, in the eyes of most doctors, if only because of the structure and functioning of the

national health-insurance system. Germany's Krankenkassen negotiated contracts with
the country's panel physicians that determined their working conditions and fees. Even
when these contracts were negotiated with the powerful DAeV/Hartmann-Bund, German
doctors viewed the sickness insurance funds as dominated by representatives of the
workers that they covered -- in other words, by socialist, union or communist influences.
At the very least, German physicians regarded the labor-dominated sickness funds as
threats to their autonomy and livelihood; at worst, they viewed the funds, with their
single-minded concern for cheap, mass treatment under very restricted bureaucratic
direction, as the enemy of good medical practice.

Considering that the anti-Marxist rage of the NSDAP was at least as strong a lure
to German voters as anti-Semitism, one would think a shared antipathy toward the left
would have attracted doctors more than many other professional groups to the brown
ranks. And it no doubt did serve as an attraction for those who joined the NSDAeB. But
the DAeV (like most professional organizations at the time) adopted a position above the
parties and attempted, with varying but considerable success, to couch its lobbying and
arguments in nonpartisan terms.

The German medical profession -- and its organizations -- were disproportionately
influenced by German doctors who happened to have Jewish backgrounds. The open and
cooperative attitudes of an older generation of German doctors had become a thorn in the
side of younger aspirants by the late 1920s. The fact that younger German doctors and
medical students founded the NS Aerztebund already in 1929 is not so much an index of

the virulence of the brown disease among German doctors: it is rather a sign that fascist
resentments could not get very far in the major national medical organizations, including
the most important one, the DAeV.

The virulent antisemitism of the NSDAP would logically have had more appeal to
members of the medical profession than most others, simply because it had been one of
the few to be completely open to Jews under the Empire. Thus young, frustrated aspirants
to a secure medical practice and income often found (particularly in big cities) that they
had to compete with older, well-established Jewish physicians. According to one
contemporary study, Jews made up sixteen percent of all Prussian doctors on the eve of
the Nazi seizure of power (as opposed to about one percent of the population).xiii

The

professional organizations and their directors reflected also the high percentage of Jews
in medicine. Ironically, too, the very permeation of professional organizations by doctors
of Jewish background posed a formidable barrier for a Nazi takeover from within -undoubtedly one of the reasons for the early founding of the NSDAeB
(Nationalsozialistischer Deutscher Aerztebund) as a separate organization. In other
words, the existence of the NSDAeB, often cited as an indicator of the strength of Nazi
sentiment in the German medical profession, may more correctly seen as an indicator of
the failure of Nazi physicians' influence in the DAeV.

Let us finally review our considerations of how the dynamics of
professionalization and the specifics of the German environment for professionals
interacted, especially in view of the relationship of the profession to Nazism.

I have argued that German medicine was indeed highly professionalized by the
end of the Hohenzollern Empire, with a number of important qualifications. Less than in
some countries, the monopoly status of German physicians as dominators of the market
in health services was only uncertainly protected. Strong competition and specialization
were other signs that the medical profession was far from unified in solidarity. A statemandated medical insurance system disrupted the traditional doctor-patient relationship
even as it brought expanded, if not usually highly lucrative practice.

Yet the path chosen by the medical profession to strengthen its position -including ever higher educational and certification requirements -- was effective in many
ways, if not as arbitrary and immediate as the imposition of a numerus clausus. The
effective resistance of the Hartmann League and its ally, the DAeV, to encroachments by
sickness funds in 1913 showed the power of professional solidarity, and repeated
"doctors' strikes" in the 1920s also made an impact.

Had Germany not frittered away much of its new-found prosperity and political
stability in World War I, one could easily imagine a continuing expansion of the medical
profession (which occurred anyway) along with the maintenance of satisfactory

professional working conditions (which did not happen). The disruptions of the war and
the socio-economic turmoil of the early and late phases of the Weimar Republic,
however, exacerbated the real and perceived problems of the German medical profession.
Especially the younger aspirants witnessed a trend toward proletarianization of their
incomes, insecurity in their practice, increasing competition, and even the crumbling of
the medical-insurance system, all worse in 1932 than ten years earlier. Despite these
threats to professional status, despite what some have termed "deprofessionalization,"
doctors, not even young ones, in Germany then or since often considered the option of
changing careers. Far more, if not a majority, appeared to prefer to change the "system."

The last Weimar governments attempted feebly to relieve some of the crisis
phenomena by facilitating admission of panel practitioners who had been waiting years,
but this typical effort merely reduced the number of patients (and thereby fees) per
physicians. The Nazi government starting in 1933 pursued its typical carrot-and-stick
tactic of dissolving autonomous professional organizations (such as the DAeV and
Hartmann League) and replacing them with "brown" ones, while simultaneously offering
the appearance of long-standing concessions, as with the creation of a the Kassenärtzliche
Vereinigung to assure smoother relations between sickness funds and panel physicians,
the Reichsärztekammer and the Reichsärzteordnung (hollow concessions, as it turned
out). Despite reduction of competition, by throttling medical enrollments, purging Jewish
and leftist physicians, etc., any promises of "normalization" and "reprofessionalization"
that National Socialism dangled before the German medical profession in the early 1930s
were later made a mockery by the most serious assault on professional standards seen in

modern times, accelerating through the peacetime years and intensifying during the
Second World War.xiv

These crisis phenomena have been cited for clues to the undoubtedly high rate of
membership by doctors in Nazi organizations after January 1933. Low rates of
participation before that date, the relative lack of success of the NSDAeB, and the
autonomy to the bitter end of the DAeV provide evidence sustaining the interpretation
that many doctors (like even more civil servants) opportunistically shifted their bets.xv
(Just as many did again in 1945.) The goal still presumably remained the growth of their
professional autonomy, power, income and status -- just as it did after 1945 again.

The professionalization stories of other groups, from attorneys (the learned
profession with the highest percentage of Jews) to schoolteachers, vary in detail, but not
in dramatic substance.xvi Whereas the Nazis' League of National Socialist Jurists had been
able to attract only a meager 1,500 lawyers to the end of 1932, it found another 78,500
members the year following January 30.xvii Purges, restrictions on admission, the Nazi
takeover under the disguise of a new national lawyers' code and national lawyers'
chamber also improved the economic lot of the remaining (and far fewer) attorneys, but
only until the beginning of the war.xviii

Perhaps what we can hypothesize from the history of modern professionalization

is that highly organized and well-educated "professionals" behave in roughly similar
ways in the face of overweening social and political crises. These include attempts to
improve their own position -- den Stand zu heben -- and rarely include a component of
"civic courage." Opportunism and, at best, resignation in the face of force majeur has
been more the rule than the exception with all major professional groups in societies
taken over by dictatorships of whatever ideology.

German doctors did not behave differently from lawyers, professors, engineers,
chemists, schoolteachers or other "professionals." The statistical variant that is obvious -more German doctors joined the National Socialist Party or its organizations after 1933
than other professional groups -- is interesting only if one holds medical professionals to
a higher standard of moral responsibility than other professionals. Even if one makes this
assumption, one must look carefully at motives and conflicted aims. (It is not, for
example, fashionable today to point out that the Hippocratic Oath forbids abortion, or that
Nazi medical directives at least partly upheld this aspect of the doctors' supposed creed.)
Enthusiasm for a greater state-sanctioned medical control over society was not
necessarily "Nazi," unless one wants anachronistically to color Rudolf von Virchow and
other nineteenth-century medical "liberals" brown. Given the lavish Nazi promises to
"reprofessionalize" medicine, offered by no other political party in such unqualified
sweep, one might almost be surprised how few MDs snapped at the lure in 1933 and
subsequent years.

One can easily read the recent literature on university professors of history and

other fieldsxix to find a certain "continuity of values" spanning at least the years 1910
through 1960, and beyond. According to this literature, German professors did not need
to join the NSDAP because they were already half-way in it, mentally. If this reasoning
holds up, why did doctors egregiously rush to the Swastika flag in such numbers?

The NSDAP had reasons for wanting to recruit medical doctors to its ranks that
simply transcended its reasons for wanting lawyers, professors, teachers and other
professionals. These reasons went along with the Nazis' desire to recruit engineers, while
also subverting any vestigial sense of professional independence on their part. Geoffrey
Herf has given a label to this: reactionary modernism.xx As Michael Kater and others
have argued, public Gesundheitspflege was to be transformed into
Volksgesundheitspflege with a brown stamp.

Yet it does not mean that concern about the "national health" or right-wing ideas
before 1933 automatically made MD's more susceptible to specifically Nazi ideas. A
close reading of the publications of Rudolf Virchow, an unimpeachably "liberal" leader
and influence in German and world medicine in the second half of the nineteenth century
and beyond, clearly indicates an acceptance of an etatist, interventionist philosophy of
care "for the people." It is by no means clear to this researcher how many of the MD's
who joined the NSDAP or its organizations might have seen the promise of the self-styled
"Government of German Renewal" of 1933 as one that gave a green light to Virchow's
frustrated demands for a "national health policy" beyond Bismarck's social insurance
system.

We cannot imagine what German doctors thought in 1932 without also looking at
what American, British, French and Polish doctors also accepted as "up-to-date" and
"scientifically founded" orthodoxy. This orthodoxy included eugenics, euthanasia,
sterilization, and experimentation on human subjects without much regard to their
"consent". One of the reasons so few German doctors were put on trial in Nuremberg (let
alone thousands of others who perhaps should have been in the dock) was a lack of
consensus among the Allies' advisors about what the minimal standards of medical ethics
really were.

To return to Michael Kater's charge, which has thankfully provoked this essay, it
seems to me dubious if German doctors were especially badly socialized and
professionalized. If we wish to understand why so many doctors (a statistically obvious
variant among the professions) joined the NSDAP, we might as well ask why so many of
them cooled to it, even before the onset of World War II and the Holocaust. We might as
well also ask why, in a world dominated by "experts," as today, doctors feel utterly
frustrated in their "profession" -- why they feel blocked from doing what they were
trained and sworn to do, to preserve and improve human life.

Maintaining the profession at a high moral cost has also been defended
under other dictatorships with the classic argument of "preventing worse" or, in the case
of the medical profession, combating the deterioration of the national health in the wake
of "deprofessionalization."

Two world wars and Hitler did more to undermine Germany's national health than
any imaginable plague. In the light of post-1945 experience, the German medical
profession (and not it alone) appears to have absorbed the lesson that war and racism are
not "healthy." The fact that the German medical profession survived Nazism and went on
to adapt again to world standards of health care for the "clientèle" is often ruled out as
evidence about "Nazi medicine." All statements about "professions", however, must be
placed on a chronological continuum. It is just as valid today to ask the uncomfortable
question "Why were GDR judges unacceptable to West German lawyers and politicians?"
as to ask "Why did the Allies accuse so few German physicians in the trials at
Nurmeberg?"

We must also not restrict our field of inquiry solely to German doctors. A
"professionalization crisis" and an "illiberal" backlash is also easy to find in other
Continental countries not yet dominated by Hitler Germany. The history of Hungarian
doctors and lawyers presents a sad but accurate mirror-image of German events, even
though the Hungarian dictator Horthy personally (and with some public and even
professional backing) resisted the Nazi Holocaust.xxi

The answers we get from the history of professions will depend on the questions
we ask. If we ask if German MD's were especially susceptible to Nazi allures, the answer
is yes. If we could ask the same questions, under the same historical circumstances, of
MD's elsewhere, the answer might be more alarming and often positive. (The anti-

semitism of American doctors in the face of pre-Holocaust European refugees is now a
sad but little-publicized fact.) If we ask whether German doctors were attracted to the
NSDAP because of their socialization and professionalization, the answer is not so clear.
An authoritarian political regime and historical tradition is not entirely necessary to
explain authoritarian and haughty thinking in doctors (leave alone other professions).

The history of professionalization can and should raise questions about the gap
between ideals and realities in the minds of "professionals." This gap has always yawned.
It has become more and more gaping as professionals organize in highly sectoralized
modern societies. If the altruistic ethos claimed by most modern professions may seem
weak compared to self-serving rhetoric, anxiety about survival, fears of competition, and
opportunism, it is nevertheless an ethos, the obligation that binds expert to client and
justifies professional privilege. The special difficulties and threats to the German medical
profession were both real and perceived under the Weimar Republic. With the political
eclipse of traditional "middle class" political parties under the weight of the Depression,
coupled with the opportunistic targeting of professional groups by the NSDAP, it is not
hard to understand the way a "professionalization crisis" could translate into a sense of
having no serious political options.

The history of German medicine in the twentieth century shows us the
consequences of interrupted professionalization. It does not deliver us the paradigmatic
example of evil consequences of professionalization as such, which so many historians of
German professions are inclined to seek out. There are enough evil consequences of

professionalization, just as there are those of industrialization and the "iron cage"
described by Max Weber.

Examining the interrupted professionalization of German

doctors in an international and comparative framework may help us better to understand
the fragility of the "professionalizing project" and the dangers posed to professional
autonomy by the powerful forces of modern societies. The temptation to secure elusive
aims of the profession by resort to authoritarian rule -- since democratic, parliamentary
government seemed unable to meet those aims -- was strong in many European countries
in 1933. The falseness of the NSDAP's "reprofessionalization" promises only became
apparent when it was too late to climb down from the tiger's back. That experience, in
turn, must go a long way toward explaining the relatively successful alliance between
professions and parliamentary democracy after 1945.
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